|
(Editor's note: This country study will appear as a
chapter in a forthcoming book "Governance & Risk--an
Analytical Handbook for Investors, Managers,
Directors and Stakeholders" to be published in early
2004 by McGraw-Hill.)
While China's transition from a state-planned into a
market-oriented economy started almost two decades
ago, corporate governance reform gained prominence
only in the past three years. In 2001, a local
business publication, "Caijing Magazine," unveiled
the YingGuangXia Chinese renminbi (RMB) 745 million
fraud, the biggest economic scandal in mainland
China's history. This revelation not only drew
attention from regulators and public investors to
the importance of corporate governance but also
exposed the weakness of the country's legal,
regulatory, and accounting systems. Corporate
governance since then has been placed at the very
top of the government's agenda. This high-profile
topic has been mentioned frequently in all of the
recent keynote speeches by China's premier, the
chairman of the Central Bank, the chairman of the
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and
numerous other government officials and scholars.
Within a mere two years, China has made some
tremendous strides on the corporate governance
front. The mandate to improve corporate governance
is a top priority among all sectors, including
government bodies, regulators, intermediaries,
corporations, and investors. Legislators,
regulators, and professional institutions have since
issued various laws, rules, regulations, and
standards with a view toward laying a foundation for
good corporate governance. However, change will not
happen overnight as separation of ownership and
management of a company is still a very new concept
in China.
The progress of corporate governance reform will
depend on both the efforts at the individual company
level to close the gap with global best practices as
well as ongoing country-level initiatives that will
shape China's corporate governance infrastructure.
Individual companies, through their own efforts, can
achieve world-class corporate governance regardless
of the local market's governance infrastructure. On
the other hand, such external environment factors
can play a critical role in raising the country's
overall standards by incentivizing or mandating
sound governance practices. This report focuses on
the broader, country-level characteristics of
China's financial markets that impact corporate
governance. Specifically, this review focuses on
four major areas that comprise China's corporate
governance infrastructure: market infrastructure,
legal environment, regulatory environment, and
informational infrastructure.
As the China market continues the transformation
from a planned economy to a market economy, the
government's role in corporate ownership is likewise
in a state of transition. Given the current trends
relating to the privatization of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), the separation of regulatory and
management roles, and the development of domestic
capital markets, the government must appropriately
manage and reconcile its concurrent but sometimes
conflicting roles as majority shareholder, business
manager, industry regulator, and sovereign ruler.
While the ongoing market reforms should lead toward
gradual improvements in the external market
environment that impacts corporate governance at the
company level, several key characteristics
underscore some fundamental weaknesses of China's
corporate governance infrastructure. Specifically,
the continued concentration of government ownership
and influence in privatized SOEs, complex and opaque
corporate ownership structures, enforcement of
shareholder rights, financial accounting
transparency and disclosure, board of director
independence and effectiveness, and the lack of
shareholder activism are all matters that require
serious attention in order to achieve meaningful
advances in corporate governance. Underlying these
challenges is the rapid but uneven development of
the domestic capital markets. While retail investors
remain a significant presence on the two major stock
exchanges, they have not, as a group, demonstrated a
strong interest in corporate governance matters.
Over time, however, the Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investor scheme will lead to more
market-driven improvements in corporate governance.
While there have been some positive developments on
the legal and regulatory fronts that have led to
some world-class corporate governance codes,
guidelines, and listing requirements, effective
implementation and enforcement of such standards may
prove elusive for years to come. China's legal and
regulatory environment has moved forward
significantly in order to keep pace with the
country's rapid economic growth and evolution to a
market economy with the passage of new laws and
regulations and the establishment of new regulatory
bodies. However, such progress has been partially
undermined by some inconsistencies and redundancies
around these new rules and institutions, partly as a
result of different government and market sector
groups pursuing reform without full coordination and
common oversight. Key rules and regulations
safeguarding governance of the financial and capital
markets are embedded in the PRC Company Law,
Securities Law, and the Code of Corporate
Governance. Companies traded on a public exchanges
are required to adapt a two-tiered board system.
There are no clear requirements regarding the
responsibility and accountability of the board
members. In practice, truly independent and
effective board oversight over executive
appointments and compensation cannot be
simultaneously legislated and implemented. Selective
enforcement is still commonly sighted.
Although mainland China's information infrastructure
is still a weak link from a corporate governance
standpoint, the relevant regulators, including the
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the China Accounting
Standards Committee (CASC), have made significant
progress in setting a variety of accounting
standards and licensing systems that have helped
close some major gaps vis-à-vis International
Accounting Standards (IAS). As with the legal and
regulatory reforms, the key issue is still
enforcement. A recent survey conducted by the
regulator revealed a high rate of fraud performed by
licensed accounting firms. This survey directly
points to the urgency of improving governance
standards among corporate and professional firms.
Recently, the new Ordinance on Disclosure
established by the CSRC sets some very strict rules
regarding public company disclosure requirements.
Nevertheless, while comprehensive laws, regulations,
and guidelines, proactive government regulatory
bodies, and strong financial institutions and other
intermediaries provide an important foundation for
market development, significant corporate governance
advances at both the macro level and at the
individual company level also require the discipline
of global market-based forces.
Market Infrastructure
| |
General Stages of Economic Development.
Transforming from a planned economy to a
market economy.
| |
Since its birth in 1949 until the
late 1970s, The People's Republic of
China (PRC) operated under a strict
planned economy system. During the
more than 30-year planned economy
period, the Communist Party of China
(CPC), under the leadership of
Chairman Mao Zedong, was the sole
ruler and creator of all policies
and regulations. The country
experienced remarkable economic
development in the early stages but
eventually witnessed a drastic
downturn due to the political
turmoil that culminated in the
Cultural Revolution. As a result, in
1976 when the Cultural Revolution
ended, the national economy was in a
deep predicament.
When the new generation of
government under the leadership of
Deng Xiaoping assumed power, a
market economy was introduced as a
complement to the existing planned
economy. During the 1980s, domestic
economic reform officially took off
nationwide. The entire 1980s
represented an initial
experimentation period for the
market economy concept.
The first real and effective
changes came in the early 1990s. In
1991, China established its very
first stock exchange in Shanghai,
and then in Shenzhen (1992). In
1992, Mr. Deng toured the major
southeast coastal cities and
reemphasized the government's
commitment to the development of a
market economy and the establishment
of market-based systems in China.
Mr. Deng's "Communist market economy
theory" was further carried forward
by his successor Jiang Zemin and Zhu
Rongji in the 1990s. By end of the
last century, the China market had
become a market economy phenomenon.
Into the new century, the
transformation continues. Although
certain industries such as banking,
telecommunications, and media and
publication still remain highly
regulated, China's accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) will
speed up deregulation of these
industries. As more international
competitors enter the market, the
PRC economy will need to break away
from its heavy reliance on
administrative and policy support
from the government and adapt to the
rules of a true market economy.
|
Role changes of government bodies.
| |
Under the leadership of the CPC, the
Chinese government acted
simultaneously as policy maker,
implementer, enforcer, and
evaluator. Unlike in other market
economies, one of the Chinese
government's roles was to approve or
endorse any business activity. With
government being the sole owner of
most businesses, it also served as
the strategic decision maker whose
representatives managed and ran the
SOEs.
The late 1980s marked the
beginning of a concerted effort to
separate governmental functions from
business functions within the SOEs
based on the notion that government
officials should not hold any
executive position in any commercial
entities. However, given the
existing government structure, the
top executives of the large
strategic SOEs are all appointed by
the Organization Department of the
CPC Central Committee. These
executives, inevitably, have strong
ties to top government officials;
thus, government is still the key
influential force within these large
SOEs. The management of the small
and midsize enterprises (SMEs),
theoretically, is appointed by their
board, and thus should have
operational autonomy and
decision-making power. However,
given the complex cross-shareholding
situation that is common among the
SOEs, government influence still
plays a key role in impacting the
SMEs' decision-making processes.
Furthermore, at the local
government levels, a
decentralization program was
introduced in 1998 whereby the local
governments were given more
incentives and autonomy to introduce
and implement local administrative
and fiscal policies according to the
local needs and economic conditions.
As a result, the bureaucratic
entrepreneurialism at the local
level generated dynamic growth rates
at the beginning stages of the
reform. However, this also created
tensions between the local and
central governments caused by
sometimes conflicting priorities.
|
Ownership Structure.
State ownership.
| |
The largest owner of PRC businesses
is the government. From the early
1950s to the late 1970s, the SOEs
constituted the sole corporate
structure that was allowed to exist.
The government owned every asset in
the country, from farmland to large
enterprises. The entire nation
during this period was educated to
work for the interests of the
country and the Party only. Under
this type of propaganda, different
interests were not allowed to exist,
and thus, no effective governance
system was considered necessary.
Not until the 1980s when the
market economy concept been
introduced did small, private
workshops and entrepreneurs start to
emerge, first in the rural areas and
later in the cities. For example, in
1978, 100% of investment in China
was from the government. This figure
reduced to 82% in 1980, and further
reduced to 66% in 1985. However,
most of the private businesses at
the time were mainly owned and
managed by the same group of people,
and conflicts of interests had not
been brought into the spotlight.
|
Privatization.
| |
The establishment of China's first
stock exchanges in the early 1990s
marked the beginning of a true
ownership diversification process.
Upon approval from the relevant
ministries, SOEs can float a portion
of their shares in the public
markets. Listed companies' capital
structure can consist of state-owned
shares, legal person shares, A
shares, B shares, H shares, and
other foreign investment shares. In
2003, authorized foreign mutual
funds with joint venture local
partners (foreign stakes must stay
below 33% in 2003, and below 49% in
2005) were allowed to invest in
domestic securities. SOEs ownership
will be further diversified by
foreign shareholdings.
As of the end of 2002, the
average state ownership stake in
Shenzhen and Shanghai listed
companies stood at about 70%. This
shareholding structure will not
change significantly in the
foreseeable future, given that the
PRC Company Law stipulates that
initial investors must maintain
their investment for at least three
years. Furthermore, the government,
in general, may not yet want to sell
down its controlling stakes in most
key industries. |
Financial Markets.
Macroeconomic condition.
| |
China is one of the few markets that
have maintained a strong growth
trend during the recent global
downturns. According to the National
Bureau of Statistics, in 2002, China
enjoyed an 8% GDP growth rate to
reach RMB10.24 trillion
(approximately US$1.2 trillion) and
became the world's second-largest
economy after the U.S. Imports and
exports remain strong. There is a
US$30.4 billion surplus in exports.
Foreign direct investment in 2002
reached US$52.7 billion. As of the
end of 2002, national foreign
reserves reached US$286.4 billion, a
35% year-on-year growth from 2001.
The national currency, the renminbi,
is still not fully convertible. The
official rate is fixed at US$1 to
RMB8.3 range.
Despite the strong growth, there
are some fundamental weaknesses in
the fiscal and national economy.
Shortage in effective demand, an
imbalanced supply structure, the
growing discrepancy in living
standards between rural and urban
areas, and an increasing
unemployment rate are some of the
primary issues yet to be addressed
by the fiscal policy makers.
|
Banking industry.
| |
China has a savings rate equivalent
to about 40% of total GDP, one of
the highest in the world. In 2002,
total savings reached US$1 trillion.
Most of the savings are in bank
deposits, with a small percentage in
equity investments. Bank financing
is the primary funding source for
companies in China. Corporations,
especially SOEs, rely largely on
bank loans and policy lending for
their Cap-ex needs.
The "big four" state-owned
commercial banks and two state
policy banks have dominated both the
lending and bank deposit markets.
From the 1970s to the 1990s, while
the PRC strived to transition from a
planned economy to a market economy,
most of the banks' lending was still
policy lending. Coupled with the
fact that all of these banks had
poor internal risk control
mechanisms and the SOEs faced
financial difficulties, mounting
nonperforming loan (NPL) problems
inevitably became very serious.
Official statistics estimate that
NPLs comprise about 24% of total
lending. However, Standard & Poor's
Ratings Services estimates that this
figure could be as high as 45%.
The second group of banks forms
the newer joint-stock banks. Since
these banks are owned jointly by
government and by private entities,
they have more operational autonomy
compared to the state-owned banks.
In addition, since these banks had
fewer policy-lending
responsibilities and a shorter
history, their NPL problems are far
less serious than the state-owned
banks. On the other hand, because of
their smaller scale and fewer
government linkages, their market
shares and relative influence are
also significantly smaller than that
of the state-owned banks.
China's accession to the WTO will
bring both opportunities and
challenges to China's banking
industry. In the initial stages,
opening up the markets to
international competition will put
considerable pressure on the
domestic banks. However, over the
longer term, the foreign banks are
expected to positively influence the
domestic banks in terms of
management skills, customer service
awareness, product diversification,
new technology, and additional
funding sources. Standard & Poor's
expects to see a more open and
competitive banking market by the
end of this decade. |
Development of the equity markets.
| |
Aside from bank financing, the
equity market represents the other
main funding source for corporations
in China. The PRC equity market has
developed into a size with market
capitalization of RMB4,253.05
billion (more than US$500 billion),
1,229 domestic listed companies, and
592.55 billion outstanding shares
(as of end-January 2003). A total of
32.5% of the total capital is
floating and tradable. There are two
stock exchanges located in Shanghai
and in Shenzhen trading four types
of equity stocks: Shanghai A shares,
Shenzhen A shares, Shanghai B
shares, and Shenzhen B shares. All
stock issuance is subject to the
approval of the CSRC.
Individual investors dominate the
PRC equity market. Of about 39.1
million investors, more than 99.6%
are individual investors. Only less
than 0.4% of total investments are
under the name of institutional
investors. However, since these
institutional investors may be
representing a group of individual
investors, the actual percentage of
institutional investors should be
less then this official figure.
Going forward, the percentage of
institutional investors should
increase as international funds are
gradually allowed to enter the
market. |
Domestic bond market.
| |
The domestic bond market is small
and underdeveloped. Currently, there
are three types of bonds traded on
the domestic bond market: treasury
bonds, policy financial bonds, and
corporate bonds. Corporate bonds
only constitute a small percentage
of the market as issuance of these
bonds is still heavily controlled by
the central and local governments.
As of the end of 2002, only 4% of
the total bonds issued were
corporate bonds, compared to 63% for
treasury bonds and 33% for financial
bonds. Though the central government
has demonstrated a strong intention
of encouraging development of the
corporate bond market, the growth
pace is much slower than that of
other capital market sectors.
Similar to the equity market
situation, retail investors make up
a majority percentage of the
investor base for the domestic bond
market. Although there are over a
dozen local credit rating agencies
with the number constantly
increasing, none of them has been
able to establish a recognized
domestic benchmarking standard.
|
Other Institutional/Cultural Factors.
Role of state and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).
| |
Social and industrial associations
in China also play important roles
in providing guidelines, policies,
and most importantly, business
connections. These associations are
categorized into three classes. The
first-class institutions are
directly under the leadership of the
State Council and/or the Ministries.
The district and provincial
associations normally are also
members of these first-class
associations. These associations
normally act as quasi government
bodies in regulating and monitoring
their members. They may also act as
a positive enforcer in improving the
corporate governance standards of
their members. However, in certain
situations, when the enforcement
adversely affects the associations'
own interests, they may also act as
obstacles to achieving good
governance.
The research institutes are the
other type of NGOs that exert
considerable influence. Such
research institutes including the
one under the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences and the research
center under the People's Bank of
China, act as think-tanks for the
central government. |
Lack of shareholder activism.
| |
As in most other emerging markets,
shareholder activism is almost an
unheard of term in the PRC market,
although this is attributable mainly
to this market's short history and
lack of institutional investors. As
of end-March 2003, about 10% of the
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share
companies were also listed on
markets open for foreign investors,
and less then 1% of the A-share
companies had cross-border capital
programs. These companies are likely
to be the first ones to make the
most progressive strides toward
better government standards. Looking
forward, as China's capital markets
open up more to international
investors and the general public's
awareness of corporate governance
increases, shareholders should
eventually become more actively
focused on protecting their own
interests and ownership rights.
|
Importance of relationships/connections.
| |
To transform from the traditional
"rule of person," to the more
systematic "rule of law" will
require not only a good system but
also a major learning and cultural
transformation. Although China has
already adopted the system to
separate government from business
over the past 20 years, strong
personnel ties and interlocked
relationship networks still make the
two inseparable. Relationships are
still one of the most important
factors in China influencing the
conduct of business. In some
situations, relationships can
actually take precedence over
legitimate decisions based on laws
or regulations. |
|
 |
Legal Infrastructure
| |
Background on Legal System and Legal
Tradition.
Legal development.
| |
The current mainland China legal
system has a history of only about
half a century. Compared to the
developed European and the U.S.
legal systems, the Chinese system is
only at a stage of infancy. PRC
Constitutions were drawn out in
1949. The National People's Congress
(NPC) has the highest authorization
to legislate and to amend the
constitutions and laws. The Standing
Committee of the NPC has the power
to interpret laws and draw up
decrees. Only the chairman of the
PRC has the power to issue these
laws and decrees.
Legal development was given the
highest priority from 1949 to 1956.
Many laws, rules, and codes were
preliminarily drawn up during this
period. Unfortunately, due to
historical reasons and political
turmoil, the system not only had not
advanced, but, rather, had retreated
during the following 20 years. Not
until 1978 was the importance of a
sound legal system recognized and
brought back to top of the party's
agenda. |
Legal system and tradition.
| |
The existing PRC legal system
basically follows the Continental
legal system, which in turn is based
on fiduciary duty, governmental
regulations, and legislation.
However, the system is still heavily
impacted by China's more than
2000-year feudalistic history.
Therefore, the true "system"
consists of not only laws and rules,
but also a large element of the
Chinese culture, which in turn,
allows the implementation and
enforcement processes to be more
discretionary. Under some
circumstances, relationships can
totally undermine a legal decision.
Selective enforcement is often seen
as a result of either the law
enforcer's personal interests, or
(better, but equally dangerous) the
special interests of certain market
groups.
Criminal laws were traditionally
given more emphasis than commercial
laws. The existing PRC legislation
also inherited some of these
traditions. Therefore, Criminal Law,
Civil Procedures Law, Administration
Law, People's Court Administration
Law, and so on, were among the
earliest ones to be issued (in
1978). The promulgation on July 1,
1979 of the Law on Joint Ventures
Using Chinese and Foreign Investment
marked a new era in China's
legislation on foreign investment
and corporate laws. It was not until
the late 1980s and early 1990s that
the bulk of rules and regulations
dealing with civil and commercial
law issues were promulgated.
Besides these issues, there are
also some major conflicts or
inconsistencies in China's existing
legal system. Many of these issues
were untouchable and were never
publicly discussed during the first
30 years of PRC history. Most of
these issues are still being debated
among the legal scholars and
practitioners. Legal versus human
rights, the independence of the
legal system, whether the CPC can
overrule the laws, and whether the
CPC can interfere with legal
decisions, are just some of these
issues. |
Principal Legal Provisions.
Company Law.
| |
The PRC Company Law was first passed
at the Eighth National People's
Congress in December 1993,
(effective July 1, 1994) and amended
in December 1999. The Company Law is
intended to regulate corporate
structures and activities, and to
protect commercial interests of the
companies, their shareholders, and
creditors. Two types of companies
are stipulated under the Company
Law: limited liability companies and
joint stock companies. The law also
articulates the responsibilities,
rights, and liabilities of
shareholders, the board of
directors, managers, and the board
of supervisors. Among the unique
aspects of PRC Company Law are the
requirements for minimum registered
capital, fixed office space, and
certain legal representatives.
All limited liability companies
should set up a Board of Directors.
For "large" companies, there should
be a separate Board of Supervisors
consisting of at least three
independent supervisors. Under the
PRC Company Law, directors and
managers are "insiders." Their
responsibilities are articulated
under the same section. However, the
Board of Supervisors is the
independent "outsider" that should
exercise supervision authority to
monitor the company's activities.
The law also gives shareholders the
right to appoint and to remove
directors and supervisors and decide
their remuneration. A series of
listing rules and regulations have
been enacted to supplement the
Company Law in terms of regulating
capital market activities (see
Regulatory Framework). |
Securities Law.
| |
The PRC Securities Law, passed and
effective on Dec. 29, 1998, is the
law that regulates capital market
issuance, trading activities, and
related matters. The law articulates
that the regulatory organization
under the State Council is the
central regulator for the PRC's
capital markets. The law states that
"a public stock issuance shall
follow the conditions as stipulated
in the Company Law and be submitted
to the securities regulatory agency
under the State Council for
verification." It also stipulates
that all stock exchanges, securities
houses, securities clearing houses,
and securities regulators must file
regular reports to the State
Statistic Bureau for auditing
purposes. The law states that
insider trading and market
manipulation are strictly
prohibited. It also provides
specific guidelines for each of the
areas relating to securities market
activities. |
Other commercial laws.
| |
The other major commercial laws that
guide the PRC commercial world
include:
- Contract Law (1999), which
assigns rights and securities to
all parties of the contracts;
- Bankruptcy Law (1988), which
addresses only bankruptcies of
state-owned entities;
- PRC Trust Law (2001), which
deals with issues relating to
the establishment and operation
of trustees;
- PRC Security Law (1995),
which stipulates the creation of
security interests such as
guarantees, mortgages, pledges,
liens and deposits; and
- The Law of Commercial
Instruments, which deals with
issues such as types of
commercial instruments, and
issue, transfer, endorsement,
acceptance, recourse, and so on,
of commercial instruments.
|
|
 |
Regulatory Framework
| |
Regulatory Bodies.
NDRC and the Ministries
| |
The State Council has final and
overriding authority over all
regulatory bodies. Under its
supervision, there are 28 Ministries
and the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC) involved in
overall strategic planning. With
input from the Ministries,
especially the MoF and the Ministry
of Commerce, NDRC researches and
oversees implementation of
nationwide strategic planning. One
of NDRC's core responsibilities is
to balance out the overall economy
in terms of demand and, the pace of
growth, urban and rural resource
allocation, and industrial
adjustment. Companies that raise
funds from the capital markets,
either domestic or cross-border,
need to get formal approval from
NDRC. |
Banking Regulatory Committee.
| |
The People's Bank of China (PBOC)
has been the regulator for the PRC's
financial industry since 1983.
Besides regulating financial
markets, the bank also acted as an
administrator in formulating and
implementing monetary policy,
issuing and administering the
circulation of the currency,
licensing and supervising financial
institutions, managing official
foreign exchange and gold reserves,
acting as fiscal agent, maintaining
payment and settlement system,
collecting and analyzing financial
statistical date, and participating
in international financial
activities in the capacity of a
central bank. To streamline the
regulatory process while providing
additional checks and balances to
the existing PBOC functions, the
State Council set up a new China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
during the 10th National People's
Congress in March 2003. This new
CBRC is taking over the regulatory
responsibilities from PBOC to
oversee banks, asset management
companies, and trust investment
companies. The CBRC will also be
responsible for drafting and
enforcing banking related laws,
rules and regulations. |
Foreign exchange.
| |
The renminbi is still not fully
convertible on the international
exchange markets. Currency control
therefore is one of the key
functional areas under the central
bank. The State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), under the
supervision of PBOC, is the
regulator for the Chinese foreign
currency market. SAFE, on a daily
basis, looks after foreign currency
trading, borrowing/lending,
transferring, international
clearing, and exchange rate setting.
It also monitors foreign exchange
market activities. Therefore, for
cross-border debt or equity
issuance, the issuer needs to also
get SAFE's approval in addition to
NDRC's mandate. |
Capital markets.
| |
The PRC's capital market is highly
and centrally regulated. The State
Council Securities Commission (SCSC)
is the highest authority body for
the capital markets. The CSRC is the
executive arm of the SCSC
responsible for conducting
supervision and regulation duties.
With its centralized supervisory
system, the CSRC establishes its
supervisory authority over all
securities and futures business,
including, stock and futures
exchanges, the listed companies,
fund management companies,
investment consulting firms, and
other intermediaries involved in the
securities and futures business.
|
|
 |
Key Listing Rules
| |
Securities Codes and Regulations.
| |
There are four types of shares that
list and trade in the domestic
equity markets. Shanghai A and
Shenzhen A shares are for domestic
investors, while Shanghai B and
Shenzhen B shares are for foreign
investors. All listings must comply
with PRC Company Law, the Memorandum
by the State Council Regarding
Standardizing Limited Company and
Joint-Stock Company According to
Company Law (1995), and the Circular
by the State Economic and Trading
Commission Regarding and
Implementation of Standardizing
Limited Company and Joint-Stock
Company According to Company Law
(1997).
In January 2002, the CSRC
released its Code of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies in
China. The code emphasizes the
importance of credibility and
integrity and identifies the
relationships between shareholders
and directors, executives and
management, and trustors and the
trustees. The code requires that all
annual general meeting details
comply with PRC Company Law.
Requirements for directors and
supervisors as well as stakeholders
rights and related items are
articulated. The code also sets
additional disclosure requirements
of corporate governance for listed
companies. |
Board structure.
| |
The Company Law requires listed
companies to adopt a two-tier board
structure. The Board of Directors
consists of two-thirds top
executives and one-third independent
directors. The Board of Directors is
accountable directly to
shareholders. The second board, the
Board of Supervisors, consists of
independent shareholders and
employees (employees cannot be less
than one-third). According to the
listing rules, directors and top
management cannot be appointed as
supervisors.
Under this two-tier structure,
the Board of Directors, as the core
board that works closely with the
management (in most cases, board
members and top management are held
by same group of person), operates
the company on a day-to-day basis.
The Board of Supervisors is the
independent board that provides
independent views and monitors the
executive management and the Board
of Directors. Given that, in most
cases, Board of Supervisors members
are connected to major
shareholder(s), they may only
represent a single interest group
but not all stakeholders.
Furthermore, since the
employee-members on the Board of
Supervisors must have a reporting
line to the top management who make
annual evaluation, promotion, and
remuneration decisions, it is
difficult for the employee-members
to play a totally independent role
without considering their personal
career interests. |
Shareholders rights.
| |
Under the existing share
registration system, all listed
shares are secured and fully
transferable. Shareholders should
have equal rights in terms of profit
sharing, participation in
shareholder meetings in person or
via proxy, voting, and monitoring/
questioning/making recommendations
to the management. However, given
that the most common shareholding
structures have one major
shareholder, it is difficult for the
minority shareholders to form a
large enough pool to reach the
minimum thresholds needed to enjoy
some of their rights, such as
nominating directors, calling
special meetings, and raising a
resolution to the board and/or at
the shareholder meetings.
From a legal standpoint, a
company's Articles of Association
have binding force on all
shareholders, directors, supervisors
and managers. The articles should be
approved at shareholder meetings.
The law also allows shareholders to
amend the content of the articles.
The PRC laws give shareholders
pre-emptive rights. Such rights can
effectively prevent the issuance of
shares to new shareholders and thus
mitigate the potential for dilution
of existing shareholder's ownership
stakes and voting rights.
|
Disclosure Requirements.
| |
In additional to the Company Law,
the Code of Corporate Governance
requires listed companies to
disclose corporate
governance-related information such
as the composition of the Board of
Directors and Board of Supervisors,
evaluations of Board of Directors
and Board of Supervisors members,
attendance records of independent
directors, and their independent
opinions on connected party
transactions and executive
appointment/removal. This code also
requires disclosure on the
establishment of functional
subcommittees and their operating
details, the discrepancy between the
actual situation and the
requirements stipulated in the code,
and the improvement plan for
corporate governance. |
|
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Other Recent Developments
| |
Enforcement.
| |
Over-regulation and
under-enforcement is a common theme
that characterizes most Asian
governance systems. China is no
exception in this regard. Selective
enforcement is commonly seen in all
sectors across China, including the
capital markets. As a result,
corporate risk takers are frequently
willing to challenge the system,
hoping that the laws or rules would
not be applied to them even if they
were caught. Such practices are
highly detrimental to the integrity
and development of China's legal and
regulatory system. |
Incentive systems.
| |
The Code of Corporate Governance
requires listed companies to set up
incentive and control systems.
Listed companies are now required to
establish a review system for
directors, supervisors, and
management, and set up a
performance-linked remuneration
mechanism. Although Nomination and
Remuneration Committees are not
compulsory under the listing rules,
executive directors generally are
not involved directly in the
decision-making processes that
determine their own compensation
packages.
However, recent statistics are
not very encouraging. Of the 1,124
listed companies, only about 6%
currently have such incentive
systems. Of the 6% that have
incorporated incentive systems, only
a few companies have adopted
corporate control systems.
|
Independent Directors.
| |
It is required that all domestic
listed companies have at least two
independent directors on or before
June 30, 2002, and one-third of the
board members must be independent
directors on or before June 30 2003.
Though independent directors only
comprise a minority percentage on
the board, it is important to have
some independent voices heard. For
major transactions and connected
party transactions, the guidelines
require independent directors'
approval before the proposal can be
submitted to the entire Board of
Directors. Independent directors can
also provide independent views on
issues such as important investment,
opportunities, directors'
appointment and removal, and
directors and executives
remuneration. However, the true
effectiveness of the independent
directors remains to be seen in
practical terms. In particular it
needs to be demonstrated that
independent directors are provided a
meaningful role on company boards,
and are not just window dressing for
compliance requirements. Active
participation of the independent
directors is more crucial than
simple compliance with the
regulatory requirements.
CSRC regularly conducts training
programs for directors and
independent directors. However,
these short training programs can
merely provide general guidance. A
lack of qualified persons to take up
the more than 3,000 independent
director positions is one of the
major issues. As China continues to
open up the capital markets to
foreign investors, more foreign
directors will need to fill this
gap. |
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 |
Informational Infrastructure
| |
Accounting Practices and Standards.
Accounting system.
| |
Except for some overseas-listed
companies, most companies in the PRC
are only required to report their
financial accounts under the local
accounting standards. The local
standards are based on PRC
Accounting Law and individual
accounting standards. Since 1993,
under the supervision of the MoF,
the CASC started developing a range
of accounting standards. This
initiative was carried a step
further in 1999 when a US$27.4
million loan from the World Bank and
a US$5.6 million equivalent credit
from the International Development
Association were provided to the
committee to fund the US$85 million
"Accounting Reform and Development
Project." This project, in turn,
completed the local standards by
either introducing new standards or
amending the old standards. In 2002
alone, 11 accounting standards were
either introduced or amended by the
CASC. As of the end of 2002, a total
of 16 standards had been issued.
|
Differences between local standards and IAS.
| |
Differences between the existing PRC
standards and IAS have narrowed
considerably. However, there are
still some major differences in key
areas such as consolidation basis,
provisions, and off-balance sheet
treatment. The bulleted list below
contains a detailed list of
discrepancies between the PRC
accounting standards and IAS as
noted by the major global accounting
firms. On the other hand, since the
new national accounting standards
became effective over the past two
years, key areas where PRC standards
and IAS have started to converge
include business combinations, lease
accounting, impairment of assets,
pre-operating expenses, foreign
currency translation, the
calculation of earning per share,
and segment reporting.
As noted in GAAP 2001 – A Survey
of National Accounting Rules Section
3 – Country Summaries, by Andersen,
BDO, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst
& Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Chinese
accounting may differ from that
required by IAS because of the
absence of specific Chinese rules on
recognition and measurement in the
following areas:
- Uniting of interests (IAS
22.8);
- Provisions in the context of
acquisitions (IAS22.31);
- Employee benefit obligations
(IAS 19);
- Discounting of liabilities
(IAS 37.45);
- The treatment of an issuer's
financial instruments (IAS
32.18/23);
- The derecognition of
financial assets (IAS 39.69);
- Hedge accounting for
derivatives (IAS39.142); and
- The treatment of the
cumulative amount of deferred
exchange difference on disposal
of a foreign entity (IAS21.37).
There are no specific rules
requiring disclosures of:
- A primary statement of
changes in equity, exceptions
for joint stock limited
enterprises (IAS 1.7);
- The fair value of financial
instruments (except for listed
investments) (IAS 32.77);
- The fair value of investment
properties (IAS 40.69);
- Discontinuing operations
(IAS 35);
- Diluted earnings per share
(IAS 33.47); and
- The current or FIFO cost of
inventory when LIFO is used
(IAS2.36).
There are also inconsistencies
between the PRC standards and IAS.
Under the PRC standards:
- Certain subsidiaries with
dissimilar activities can be
excluded from consolidation (IAS
27.14);
- Subsidiaries are excluded
from consolidation if intended
for sale, even if previously
consolidated (IAS 27.13);
- For most business
combinations accounted for using
purchase accounting, the
identifiable assets and
liabilities of subsidiaries
acquired are consolidated based
on their book values (IAS
22.40);
- Either provisions for major
overhaul costs or deferral of
incurred major overhaul costs
are allowed (SIC 23);
- Trading and derivative
financial assets and liabilities
are generally not held at fair
value (IAS 39.69/93);
- Proposed dividends are
accrued (IAS10.11);
- Deferred tax accounting is
uncommon and, when done, is
calculated on the basis of
timing differences, with the
deferral method or the liability
method allowed (IAS12);
- Definition of extraordinary
items is wider (IAS 8.6/12);
- Certain disclosures relating
to primary segments (for
example, acquisitions and
depreciation of assets) are not
required (IAS 14.57/58); and
- There are no rules
addressing the consolidation of
special-purpose entities (SIC
12).
In certain enterprises, there
other issues could lead to
differences from IAS:
- Under some circumstances,
finance leases can be recognized
at the undiscounted amount of
minimum lease payments (IAS
17.12); and
- There is no specific
requirement for segment
reporting to be prepared (IAS
14.44).
|
Implementation of the system.
| |
Besides the accounting standards,
the overall Chinese accounting
system is still evolving.
Implementation is the key governance
challenge relating to the PRC
accounting system. In December 2001,
China's National Audit Office
randomly checked the auditing work
of 16 CPA firms. A total of 32 audit
reports were examined, of which 21
were from local listed companies.
Out of the 32 audit reports checked,
23 reports issued by 14 CPA firms
were found to contain seriously
inconsistent facts. The total
fabricated amounts or discrepancies
contained in these 23 financial
reports reached as high as RMB7.1
billion (approximately US$860
million). In this investigation, 72%
of financial reports, 86% of the CPA
firms' audit engagements, and 41
accountants were involved in
fabrication of financial statements.
These figures directly point to the
urgency for improving governance
standards among the corporate and
professional firms. It also sent a
strong message to the regulators
regarding the need for a more strict
compliance requirement. |
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Transparency and Disclosure
| |
Quality of Disclosure.
| |
In 2001 and 2002, the CSRC released
a series of disclosure standards and
requirements. To ensure quality of
disclosure, the new Ordinance on
Disclosure requires the heads of the
company, the accounting department,
and the external accounting firm to
make a public announcement ensuring
true and complete disclosure of the
reports. It also requires disclosure
of any cross shareholdings among the
top 10 largest shareholders.
|
Timing of Financial Reporting.
| |
All publicly listed companies have
to file and disclose financial
results on a quarterly basis.
Continuous disclosure is not
required. However, any significant
events that may impact stock prices
have to be publicly announced
immediately. |
Remuneration and Nomination.
| |
Matters involving executive
nominations and remuneration are
normally decided behind closed
doors. Detailed disclosure on
remuneration in the public domain is
generally nonexistent. This is
largely due to the fact that key
directors and executive members are
appointed by the major shareholder,
that is, the government. There is
still a large gap between the salary
levels of government officials and
private-sector market rates. It
remains culturally awkward and
sensitive to publicly compare pay
levels of government officials,
directors, or top management
appointed by the government in the
listed companies, against market
rates. Disclosure of detailed
remuneration information at the
individual level is such a sensitive
issue that even the new Corporate
Governance Code did not address it.
|
Auditor Independence.
| |
The national accounting professional
organization: the Chinese Institute
of Certified Public Accountants,
operated through the MoF, has
administered and issued the
professional designation "Certified
Public Accountant" (CPA) to
qualified candidates since 1988. The
national examination for Chinese
CPAs was introduced in 1994. The CPA
firms are also licensed and required
to comply with the rules and
standards.
The listing rules require the
external auditor of listed company
to have CPA licenses. Most of these
appointments are awarded without a
public tendering process.
Information on how and why a CPA
firm is selected remains
confidential within the "insider"
circle of the top management.
Furthermore, there is no requirement
for disclosure of auditor fees
versus nonaudit fees in the annual
reports. The regulators are
currently in the process of setting
rules on auditor rotations. Once
implemented, it will be a positive
step in enhancing auditor
independence. |
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